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The primacy of partisanship over issue-attitudes is a foundational finding in political behavior.
Yet, scholars find that not all issue-attitudes are created equal. Many citizens are members of
issue-publics: groups of people that are passionate about a single or narrow subset of related issues.
This raises the question: are issue-publics uniquely capable of shedding partisan tribalism in favor
of issue-based concerns? I contend that issue-publics’ policy preferences should change little when
presented counter-attitudinal party cues. Additionally, issue-publics should vote for out-party
candidates if both candidates adopt out-party stances. Otherwise, issue-publics should vote for their
party’s candidate. Other research that explored these questions had important limitations, which I
resolve by coding an open-ended response in conjunction with an issue-ranking system. This allowed
me to test the relative influence of partisanship against several issues of varying importance that
were unique to each respondent. While the results regarding whether issue-publics resist partisan
cues are unclear, I find strong support for my framework outlining the conditions under which
people will vote for out-partisans.
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INTRODUCTION
Towards the end of the Obama administration, the Transpacific Partnership (TPP) was finalized,
which lowered tariffs and other barriers to trade with eleven other countries. Some lamented the
effect the TPP might have on US labor. Pro-labor politician, Bernie Sanders (I-VT), went so
far as to say it would “devastate working families”. Elizabeth Warren (D-MA) signed a letter to
President Obama asking him to back out of the deal. The AFL-CIO released material to Congress
claiming that the TPP and trade deals like it are “corporate-driven” and “undermined workers’
bargaining power”. Despite the criticism among party elites and supporters, Secretary Hillary
Clinton supported the TPP in her 2016 bid for president, bucking the party’s usual reluctance
to expand trade. Her opponent, Donald Trump, was vehemently opposed to free trade and the
TPP. Indeed, Trump famously called NAFTA “the worst trade deal in history”1, which was enacted
by Secretary Clinton’s husband during his presidency. She proceeded to post the lowest margin
of victory among union households for a Democrat since Walter Mondale and scored 20 points
lower with union households than Barack Obama in 2012. Trump won the union vote in Ohio by
nine points. Michigan, a state with over 4 million union works according the Bureau of Labor and
Statistics, was lost by just over 10,000 votes. Steve Rosenthal, interim political director at SEIU,
when asked why Clinton did so poorly with labor, said, referring to trade issues, “people want
somebody in there who is going to be fighting for them on those issues”. While merely suggestive,
it’s plausible that labor voters casted aside a nearly century-long devotion to the Democratic Party
when the parties changed their stances on policies that affect their most important interests.
This raises the question: are there circumstances under which people will abandon partisan
considerations in favor of issue preferences? On the surface, it would seem unlikely given that most
citizens seem to lack sincere attitudes about most policies, but many have sincere party identification
(Converse, 1964). I argue that the answer lies with issue-publics. Issue-publics, a concept first
1Of course, this was rhetorical. As a New York native, President Trump obviously knew that the Red Sox trading
Babe Ruth to Yankees in 1920 for $100,000 is the clear winner of that ignominious title.
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articulated by (Converse, 1964), can be defined as groups of people that are passionately interested
in a single or narrow subset of issues. Unlike the policy positions of the general public, issue-publics’
attitudes are theorized to be stable over time, resistant to change, and readily accessible (Krosnick,
1990; Krosnick et al., 1993; Krosnick and Petty, 1995; Pomerantz et al., 1995; Eagly and Chaiken,
1995). Thus, while citizens may struggle to apply most of their policy preferences to the political
world, issue-publics may be uniquely situated to do so. Importantly, there is evidence to suggest
that most people belong to at least one issue-public (Krosnick, 1990; Gershkoff, 2006).
To test whether issue-public members are less sensitive to party cues, I use a vignette design.
Vignettes are useful for this purpose because they allow me to manipulate the strength of the
party cue delivered and the policy content the cue addresses. Given the experimental design, it
provides causal leverage over whether respondents evaluation of a policy is driven by their issue
preferences or partisan identity. Finally, to the extent the respondents believe the vignette to be
providing real political news, the results may present fewer external validity concerns than many
other experimental designs.
Another assertion I make is that issue-publics will vote for out-party candidates if they are aware
that both candidates took non-traditional party stances on the issue they care about. This is difficult
to test using observational data because candidates increasingly adopt traditional party stances as
the parties become better sorted and more polarized (Hetherington, 2009), so a limited number of
elections will feature candidates that simultaneously adopted out-party stances. Furthermore, when
this does occur, I would have to rely on conventional measurements of issue-public membership,
which have important limitations (Gershkoff, 2006; Henderson, 2014) that I aim to overcome utilizing
a different measurement strategy. To solve these problems, I used a choice-based conjoint design,
which randomizes candidate information along important demographic and issue dimensions. In
doing so, conjoint tasks run the risk of producing candidate profiles that don’t reflect real-world
candidates, which raises external validity concerns, however, they allow researchers to accurately
assess the effect of independent candidate characteristics on vote choice (Leeper and Robison, 2018).
Additionally, I can subset the data such that the only candidate pairs examined are ones where
copartisan candidates disagreed with the respondent on the issue they cared about most, while the
out-partisans agreed. In this subset, if the marginal effect of co-partisanship is negative, it would
suggest that respondents engaged in issue-based rather than partisan-based voting. In sum, this
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design offers causal leverage over the question of interest and the opportunity to implement a new
issue-public measurement.
The results for the vignette experiment were mixed. While issue-public support for fictitious
bills addressing an issue they care about was unaltered across weak and strong party cues, this was
also the case for non-issue public members as well. I believe these results should be understood as
either artifacts of the sample or certain aspects of the experimental design rather than illuminating
anything substantive about how people navigate issue judgments in light of party cues.
However, the notion that issue-public relies on issue-based considerations over partisanship when
they are in conflict was robustly supported by the conjoint design. Across the full data, candidates
going from stances that are inconsistent with an issue-public member’s policy preference regarding
the issue they care about most to one that is consistent increased the likelihood of receiving their
vote by 31.5%. Additionally, when the conjoint data is subset such that respondents disagreed with
the copartisan candidate and agreed with the out-partisan candidate, they were 34.7% less likely
to vote for the copartisan candidate than the out-partisan. Despite the limitations of the data
and methods, these results suggest that issues preferences may have an under-appreciated role in
citizens’ political decision-making. These findings are also consistent with the possibility that issue
preferences are a contributing factor to the development and/or maintenance partisan identities.
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LITERATURE, THEORY, AND HYPOTHESES
Issue-Publics
Issue-publics are groups of people who express great interest in a single or narrow subset of related
issues. This could be due to self-interest or moral reasons. While few people tend to possess stable
attitudes about most issues (Converse, 1964), most citizens belong to at least one issue-public
(Krosnick, 1990; Gershkoff, 2006). Unlike the policy positions of the general public, issue-publics’
attitudes are stable over time, resistant to change, and readily accessible (Krosnick, 1990; Krosnick
et al., 1993; Krosnick and Petty, 1995; Pomerantz et al., 1995; Eagly and Chaiken, 1995).
In addition, scholars have found issue-publics demonstrate specialized political knowledge and
information seeking tendencies. For example, we know that issue-publics demonstrate high knowledge
about a given issue that is uncharacteristic of the general population (Krosnick, 1990). This is
because they are more likely to be active seekers of relevant issue information, which also leads
to more extreme attitudes regarding that issue (Kim, 2009; Kim and Grunig, 2011). To facilitate
their desire for issue-specific information, issue-publics disproportionately rely on the internet for
political news over conventional media (Jang and Park, 2013; Kim, 2009; Kim and Grunig, 2011).
Given the internet’s ability to cater to the needs of issue-publics, in conjunction with the internet’s
increasing ubiquity, the modern information environment could facilitate the growth of issue-publics
and their political relevance. Importantly, even when issue-publics do not actively seek information,
they better remember issue-specific information received passively, which leads to information gaps
between issue-public members and non-members (Henderson, 2014). Given that issue-publics are
passionate and knowledgeable about an issue/set of related issues, they know how the major parties
stand on their issue of interest (Kim, 2009; Henderson, 2014).
Issue-publics are important because, as I will outline in the next two sections, citizens’ partisan-
ship generally supersedes their policy preferences. Specifically, when they learn that their policy
preferences conflict with their preferred party’s stance, they update their policy preferences to better
align with their party. Additionally, partisanship seems to outweigh issue-based considerations when
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making voting decisions and evaluating the performance of elected officials. These findings call into
question citizens’ ability to hold elected officials accountable. If people are unable to maintain their
policy preferences in the face of elite pressure and they support their party’s candidates regardless
of their own policy preferences, elected officials will go unpunished for deviating from constituents’
policy preferences. However, to the extent issue publics exist, they might represent an important
qualification of research that characterizes citizens as poorly suited to hold politicians accounatable.
A conceptualization of the American polity as an amalgamation of issue-publics allows for the
possibility that citizens are generally politically unsophisticated and most of their attitudes are
subordinate to their partisanship, yet are still capable of holding their elected officials accountable
to move policy in their preferred direction on the issues most important to them.
Citizen Responses to Party and Policy Cues
The political world is byzantine. Most issues that governments are asked to address are far removed
from citizens’ lives and interests, which deters people from bearing the research costs necessary to
develop opinions on most issues. As a result, most citizens fail build issue-based understandings of
the political world (Campbell et al., 1960; Converse, 1964). In fact, even on major issues, citizen’s
policy preferences seem disconnected from ideology as it is conceived along the liberal-conservative
spectrum (Converse, 1964; Kinder and Kalmoe, 2017), unrelated to each other (Converse, 1964;
Baldassarri and Gelman, 2008), and unstable over time (Converse, 1964). Other evidence suggests
that even when provided policy information to do so, citizens fail to update their policy stances in a
manner that advances their preferred outcome (Bartels, 2005, 2008).
To navigate the complexity inherent in social life, people rely on group influence. Indeed, social
identity scholars have long noted that people demonstrate in-group bias (Tajfel, 1974; Abrams
and Hogg, 2006) and are sensitive to shared group opinion (Cialdini and Trost, 1998; Hogg and
Abrams, 1990) because people are inclined to believe members of the in-group share similar values
and goals with them (Sherif, 1936; Abrams and Hogg, 1988). Partisanship is one such social identity
(Campbell et al., 1960; Converse, 1964; Greene, 2002; Huddy, 2003). It acts as a perceptual lens
through which people engage with politics and is the strongest predictor of vote choice in the
aggregate, especially in low information contexts (Converse, 1964; Campbell et al., 1960; Schaffner
and Streb, 2002; Levendusky, 2009). Like religious affiliation, partisanship is socialized early in
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childhood (Jennings and Niemi, 1968; Greene, 2002), resistant to change (Converse, 1964; Campbell
et al., 1960; Greene, 2002), and constrains peoples’ core values (Goren, 2005).
While citizens’ issue-preferences are increasingly becoming aligned with their preferred party’s
stances (Baldassarri and Gelman, 2008), it is impossible for most citizens’ policy preferences to be
perfectly aligned with their party for three reasons. First, citizens have difficulty correctly identifying
party positions on various issues (Converse, 1964; Biggers, 2012). As a result, the preference they
report is more likely to be untethered to the party stance due to ignorance. Second, there is at least
some sincere opinion heterogeneity among party members; indeed, (Hillygus and Shields, 2014) find
that a quarter of self-identified partisans report they disagree with their party on at least one issue
that is important to them. Third, the parties’ platforms evolve with respect to certain issues as we
saw with race during the 1960s and with trade in 2016.
Political scientists have often wondered how citizens behave when they learn that their policy
preferences do not align with their party’s. Based on the literature above it would be reasonable
to infer that people will adjust their policy preferences to comport with their party identity. In
general, that is exactly what scholars found. (Tesler, 2015) found observational evidence to suggest
that people updated their policy preferences about health care policy based on their opinion of
President Obama. Similarly, (Cohen, 2003) used a vignette experiment to explore whether people
would maintain their reported policy preferences when provided a party cue that contradicted their
priors. His respondents demonstrated a tendency to update their policy preferences to comport with
the signal provided by their preferred party. Importantly, Cohen’s findings held among politically
knowledgeable respondents, so they likely had the political knowledge and cognitive resources city
elites said X is important, the mail recipient might not agree. One limitation of (Cohen, 2003), was
that his experimental design did not offer respondent’s any policy information. As a result, it is
possible that his respondents’ reported policy preferences were based on too little information to
withstand a heuristic as information and value-rich as a partisan cue. Had the respondents been
given the requisite policy information to develop a more sincere attitude, their preferences might be
more resistant to party cues.
To address this possibility, (Bullock, 2011) conducted two vignette experiments that were longer
and provided more policy information than previous vignette experiments exploring party versus
policy cues. Using these more policy-heavy designs, the author found that while respondents
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demonstrated a tendency to offer greater support for their party’s preferred position with respect to
a hypothetical health care bill, the policy information seemed to have a greater effect on respondents’
support for the bill. These results held for partisans of both parties and low and high knowledge
respondents. Additionally, he found evidence to suggest that respondents were just as attentive to
policy details regardless of whether they received a party cue. While supportive of the notion we
may have a healthy democratic society, the results had two important limitations to their external
validity. First, respondents demonstrated support for their party even after receiving one party
cue and simultaneously being given a large dose of policy information. It is possible that repeated
party cues, as often occurs with salient issues, would have an additive effect that would eventually
overwhelm the influence of policy-based considerations. Furthermore, parties tend to offer policy
information that is congruent with their cue to bolster their claim, which may further exacerbate the
tendency for partisans to acquiesce to their party’s preferred positions. Second, in an experimental
context, there is no real political stakes and, accordingly, people may behave differently. For example,
it is plausible that citizens more heavily rely on party cues in real-life than experimental contexts
because people perceive the consequences of being misinformed and subsequently harming their
party as too high.
Accordingly, (Boudreau and MacKenzie, 2014) explored this question in the observational
context. Specifically, they examined change in Californian’s policy preferences on a set of 2010
ballot initiatives where the two parties took opposing stances. Respondents were assigned to receive
either a control, party cue, policy information, or a party cue and policy information. Additionally,
the policy information was randomly assigned to either reinforce the respondent’s priors, conflict
with their priors, or be balanced. The authors found that respondents in the party cue condition
consistently updated their preferences in their party’s desired direction. In the policy information
condition, respondents tended to update their priors in accordance with the policy information,
but these results were not as strong as the party cue condition, which conflicts with the findings
of (Bullock, 2011). When both party cues and policy information were provided, respondent’s
preferences were no different from the control group. Importantly, the authors found that high
knowledge respondents weighed policy information more heavily than the party cue, which is
consistent with previous work (Kam, 2005).
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(Boudreau and MacKenzie, 2018) ran a similar design to explore whether people would update
their tax policy preferences when provided information about inequality. Again, they found, in
aggregate, that respondents tended to rely more heavily on party cues than policy information.
However, they found people who reported the greatest desire to address inequality updated their
tax policy preferences based on the inequality information more than the party cue.
While an improvement, these studies also have an important limitation: they don’t account
for how important the issue is to the respondent. To that end, (Mullinix, 2016) argued that if an
individual does not have reason to believe an issue is personally salient, but the issue is important
to their party, they will alter their preferences to support their party. Conversely, when they are
given reason to believe the issue is personally salient, but it does not matter to the party, they
will modify their opinions based on self-interest. If personal and party salience are both high
or low, their will be no change in policy preference. Mullinix conducted a vignette experiment
where the manipulation conditions are 2 (high or low party polarization) x 2 (high or low issue
importance) x 2 (traditional or reversed party endorsements, which produces an eight-condition
design. The manipulations are checked against two control conditions. First, no polarization, no
issue importance cue, and no party endorsement. Second, low polarization, low issue importance,
no party endorsement. Treatments were delivered in the form of vignettes about a major bill in
Congress. The party cue was operationalized using level of party polarization on the bill. Higher
inter-party polarization represented a stronger party cue. Personal importance was manipulated by
having “experts” in the vignette discuss the direct impact the proposed bill would have on people’s
lives. Personal salience was considered high when the experts said the bill would have a large effect
on citizens’ lives. Using this design, Mullinix found support for his framework. This demonstrated
that citizens are at least capable of ignoring weak party cues and resisting strong party cues when
they believe an issue is important to them.
In total, the literature above demonstrates that partisanship generally holds primacy over
issue attitudes. There are important caveats. People with high political knowledge (Cohen, 2003;
Boudreau and MacKenzie, 2014) and people that believed the issue was important (Mullinix, 2016;
Boudreau and MacKenzie, 2018) were resistant to party cues. Recent research by (Butler and
Hassell, 2018) also found that mailers from city elites advancing certain issues as important city
priorities did not alter the policy priorities of the citizens who received them. Notably, the citizens
8
that received the mailers generally possessed high knowledge given that they were on local politicians’
mailing lists.
Taken from a generalist perspective, these results would do little to ameliorate concerns about
citizens’ capability to hold elites accountable because only the most politically sophisticated citizens
are capable of shirking party cues. Yet, taken from an issue-publics perspective, the results can
be interpreted in a more promising way. From the issue-publics perspective, most citizens are
knowledgeable about a single/narrow subset of issues and their opinions on these issues are resistant
to change (Gershkoff, 2006). Additionally, work in the motivated reasoning literature suggests
that people have a tendency to passively accept information that buttresses their priors, while
denigrating information that challenges them, especially for those with high political knowledge and
strong priors (Taber and Lodge, 2006; Taber et al., 2009). It seems reasonable to expect that when
issue-publics receive party cues that conflict with their policy preferences on the issue they care
about, they will behave like the high knowledge citizens and not adjust their preferences. This leads
to my first hypothesis:
H1: Issue-public members will not adjust their preferences in response to party cues.
An implication of this framework is that issue-public members’ preferences will be unchanging
in the face of party cues regardless of general political knowledge. This is because issue-publics
can possess specialized knowledge and passion for a single political issue, while being ignorant and
apathetic to politics broadly. Conversely, for non-issue public members, their ability to maintain
their policy preferences when pressured by party elites will be dependent on their political knowledge,
much like the findings in prior literature. Another important implication, is that most citizens
are capable of resisting party cues one one issue, given that most people are issue-public members
(Krosnick, 1990; Gershkoff, 2006), rather than only a few knowledgeable citizens. If this framework
is true, parties would only be able to influence citizens’ preferences on matters that are unimportant
to them.
Partisanship and Issues in Voting Decisions
As stated earlier, partisanship is the best predictor of vote choice (Campbell et al., 1960; Converse,
1964; Greene, 2002). The 2016 presidential election was an impressive reminder of this reality given
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that Secretary Hillary Clinton and President Donald Trump carried 94% and 92% their respective
parties’ bases (Pew Research, 2018). Coupled with the canonical finding that issue-preferences are
only weakly predictive of candidate choice (Converse, 1964) and the literature cited earlier about
the fickle-nature of most policy-preferences, it would be easy to conclude that most individual
issue-preferences do little to explain voting behavior relative to partisanship.
What would it take for citizens to engage in issue-based voting? Scholars have long argued
that in order for citizens to engage in issue-based voting, they have to perceive substantive policy
differences between the two candidates (Berelson et al., 1954; Downs, 1957; Converse, 1964). It
follows from these spatial model theories that if one cares about a policy at stake in an election, as
the perceived policy gap between the two candidates on that issue widens, the more likely one will
vote based on that policy concern. This is because the expected policy utility to be gained or lost
by electing one candidate over the other increases when the policy space between them widens.
Yet, this framework leaves two important things out. The first is salience, the citizen needs to
care about the issue, otherwise, no policy utility at stake. The second is information, the citizen
needs to be aware of the candidates’ policy stances or they will not be able to act on their preferences.
We know that issue-publics by definition care deeply about certain issues. Additionally, scholars
have confirmed that issue-publics selectively expose themselves to candidate policy information
relevant to their issue-public (Iyengar et al., 2008; Kim, 2009). As a result, they are more likely to
know the candidate stances on the policy they are about (Holbrook et al., 2005; Henderson, 2014).
Issue-publics also exhibit greater attitude extremity than non-issue-public members (Krosnick, 1990;
Gershkoff, 2006; Kim, 2009), which makes them more likely to perceive the candidates’ stances as
distant from each other (Krosnick, 1990; Boninger et al., 1995). Taken together, it would seem
as though issue-publics should be a good place to look for issue-based voting. But this raises the
question: if so many people are members of issue-publics (Krosnick, 1990; Gershkoff, 2006), why is
it so hard to find evidence of issue-based voting?
The answer may lie with observational equivalence. Scholars have noted that party elites
have increasingly polarized for decades (McCarty et al., 2016) and citizens have responded to this
polarization by becoming increasingly partisan (Hetherington, 2001). This elite polarization has
clarified to the electorate what the “appropriate” parties are for liberals and conservatives. This has
caused the electorate to become increasingly “sorted” with liberals in the Democratic Party and
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conservatives in the Republican Party (Levendusky, 2009). This research suggests that issue-publics,
given their heightened knowledge and passion about a certain issue, are likely to be well-sorted
based on their policy preferences regarding the issue they care about. If this is the case, for most
people in most elections, it is impossible to discern why they vote for their party’s candidate. Is it
out of party loyalty? Or is it based on their issue preferences?
There have been a few notable attempts to tease apart this equivalence problem. (Highton,
2010) used observational data to explore whether aggregate presidential voting behavior was more
responsive to candidate issue contrast or party issue contrast. Highton found that the mass
electorate’s voting behavior was more responsive to the policy contrast between candidates than
the parties. While not directly related to voting behavior, (Highton, 2012) found that individual
economic and cultural issue-preferences seem to influence presidential approval regardless of whether
they share the president’s party affiliation. However, he did find that people tend to penalize the
out-party presidents more than copartisan presidents for advancing policies that are inconsistent
with their preferences.
(Hillygus and Shields, 2014) is a particularly important piece. They sought to explore which
voters were most susceptible to campaign appeals. They argued that persuadable voters are those
that hold strong policy preferences that are salient to the individual and conflict with their party.
The voters (Hillygus and Shields, 2014) focus on could also be understood as cross-pressured
issue-publics. The authors hypothesized that when persuadable voters receive campaign appeals
that highlight this cross-pressure, they are more likely to vote against their partisan preferences. To
test this assertion, Hillygus and Shields conducted a panel study that re-interviewed respondents
repeatedly throughout the 2000 campaign. A voter was considered persuadable if they were partisan,
reported an issue position that conflicts with their own party, and the issue is personally important.
By this measure, the author found that a quarter of the electorate is persuadable. Lacking data
on individual exposure to campaign appeals, they employ proxies designed to impute campaign
exposure and compare the candidate preferences of persuadable and non-persuadable voters. They
found that these cross-pressured voters were more likely to change their candidate preference as
election day approached, after the national conventions, after the candidate debates, and that
persuadable voters defected from their party more often in battleground states.
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This book suggests that, under the right conditions, issue-publics will abstain from partisan-
based voting in favor of issue-based voting. While important, its reliance on observational data opens
causality concerns. By using national events to operationalize campaign appeals, it leaves open
the possibility that some alternative factor influenced the respondents’ preferences that has little
to do with the candidates’ issue stances. Additionally, using closed-ended questions to determine
attitude importance may lead the authors to over-estimate the presence of issue-publics due to
the social desirability bias to report issues as important (Gershkoff, 2006). If this is the case
it changes the meaning of their results in two important ways. First, the authors’ claim that a
quarter of the electorate is persuadable would be an over-estimation. Second, if over-estimation
occurred, the authors falsely categorize some respondents as persuadable, which would mean they
underestimated the importance of issue-based considerations among the genuinely persuadable
voters (i.e. cross-pressured issue-publics). Finally, the empirical evidence they use is limited to the
2000 elections, which create generalizability concerns. My design will address the causality and
measurement concerns.
(Leeper and Robison, 2018) used a candidate conjoint to test what they called the “Issue Public
Hypothesis”, which stipulated that issue voting would increase as a function of issue importance
and agreement with the candidate. Utilizing a two-wave survey design, they obtained closed-
ended measures of respondents’ policy preferences and perceptions of issue-importance across five
salient issues of the time: the Trans-Pacific Partnership, ISIS, cap and trade, taxing the rich, and
paths to citizenship for undocumented immigrants. Respondents in the second wave of the survey
participated in a choice-based candidate conjoint. Candidates attributes were randomized across
thirteen dimensions: policy positions on the five issues listed above on a seven-point Likert scale,
partisanship, and seven demographic characteristics. Using their responses from wave one, the
authors obtained measures of policy distance between the candidate’s positions and each respondent
using the following formula: —Respondent - Candidate A Stance— - —Respondent - Candidate B
Stance—, which was rescaled to range from 0 to 1. They argued that if people engage in issue-voting,
respondents should prefer candidates they are closer to them along the policy dimensions with
greater weight being placed on the issues they cited as important. Using this design, (Leeper
and Robison, 2018) found that no evidence to suggest candidate policy positions or reported issue
importance had any effect on candidate selection. Counterintuitively, the only statistically significant
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relationship among the five issues they found was that as the reported importance of ISIS increased,
candidate distance from the respondent was less predictive of selection, which is the opposite of
what would be expected if the “Issue Public Hypothesis were” true.
(Leeper and Robison, 2018) is a major refutation of the “Issue Public Hypothesis”. However,
this design had two important limitations that obscure the definitiveness of their findings. First,
when given closed-ended issue importance questions, respondent’s likely feel a pressure to over-report
how important the issues are to them (Gershkoff, 2006; Henderson, 2014). If academics in political
science ask how important an issue in the news is (like ISIS or the TPP), respondents may be
inclined to say the issues are important even if they believe the issues are distant or mundane. If
this is the case, respondents that are relatively apathetic about a certain issues will be coded in the
same category as sincere issue-publics and diminish the observed effect of issue-importance in the
analysis. My measure of issue-public membership overcomes this problem by allowing respondents
to inform me what issues they think are important and have the candidates in my conjoint task
debate sets of issues that are unique to each respondent.
Second, by having the candidates take positions along a seven-point Likert scale for each
policy, the authors aimed to finely measure policy distance between the respondent and candidates.
Ironically, a tool designed to help researchers and respondents accurately navigate this policy space
may have been a source of confusion for respondents. I argue it is likely difficult for the respondents
to conceptualize what the policy positions of the candidates substantively mean on a seven-point
scale. Take for example ratification of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which was used by the authors.
What is the difference between slightly and moderately supporting ratification? How are respondents
supposed to map their own preferences in relation to those two positions, while simultaneously
do the same for four other issues they care about to varying degrees. The task may have given
respondents too much information to navigate effectively. If this is the case, respondents may have
relied on party cues just because it is easier to understand. This would especially be a concern if
they over-reported issue importance. The candidates in my conjoint only take one of three stances:
supports the policy, opposes the policy, or the candidate has not taken a stance on the issue. This
should reduce the ambiguity of candidate stances and reduce the cognitive burden on respondents.
In sum, two key aspects of the authors’ design may have led them to underestimate issue-based
considerations regarding candidate choice.
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Here I develop a theoretical framework that will outline the specific informational and political
circumstances under which I expect issue-publics to vote for an out-party candidate. This framework
rests on two assumptions. First, in the absence of information regarding candidate stances on
issue-public domains, they will assume the candidates have adopted the traditional party stances.
In other words, issue-publics will assume that copartisans will adopt the issue-position that is
consistent with their preferences and out-partisans do not. This is because issue-publics tend to
be aware of the traditional party stances on issues relevant to their issue-public. Second, if an
issue-public member knows/perceives that both candidates share the same stance, they will vote for
the copartisan candidate. This is because if the two candidates advance the issue-public’s interests
equally, the issue-public member does not get any net policy cost or benefit from the candidates
regarding their issue-public domain, which leaves them with partisan considerations. Issue-public
members, being partisans themselves, will have a bias towards the copartisan candidate all else
being equal. Additionally, given that their preferred party, on the whole, is more amenable to their
issue-public’s interest in the legislative body, they still have a policy incentive to elect their party’s
candidate all else equal. Thus, issue-publics will only vote against their party if they are certain both
candidates adopted non-traditional party stances. In this scenario, because issue-publics’ policy
utility is primarily derived from advancing the interests of their issue-public, they will vote for
the out-party candidate because the out-partisan provides more policy utility than the copartisan
candidate.
Given the framework above, issue-publics will only defect from their party if two conditions are
met. First, they need to be aware of both candidates stances on the issue of interest. Otherwise,
the best the out-party candidate can do is tie the copartisan candidate, because it will be assumed
that the out-party candidate is against their issue-public’s interest. Second, both candidates need
to adopt the non-traditional stance on the issue of interest. This is because if they both adopt
traditional stances, the co-partisan has a policy and partisan advantage; and if the candidates adopt
the same stance, the candidates provide the same policy utility, but the issue-public member’s
partisan bias will lead them to favor the co-partisan. This leads to my final hypothesis:




Limitations of Prior Work
Despite the simplicity of issue-publics as a concept, they are surprisingly difficult to accurately
measure. With important exceptions, scholars have used three methods to categorize citizens
into issue-publics. Each come with their own limitations. The most common method is using a
closed-ended question, typically attitude strength or issue importance, and categorizing people into
issue-publics if they report at or above a certain threshold (Krosnick, 1990; Krosnick and Petty,
1995; Holbrook et al., 2005; Kim, 2009; Hillygus and Shields, 2014). One limitation associated
with this method, particularly with formats that rely on importance, is that people will feel a
social desirability bias to over-report the importance they ascribe to most issues (Gershkoff, 2006).
This will leaves researchers vulnerable to false-positives when categorizing people into issue-publics
(Henderson, 2014). Attitude strength measures suffer from similar drawbacks given that scholars
are uncertain if closed-ended attitude strength questions say something systematic about their
believes (Converse, 1964). It is possible these responses are merely based on temporarily, rather
than chronically, accessible considerations (Zaller et al., 1992).
The second involves coding people into issue-publics based on open-ended responses (Converse,
1964). Typically, the wording of these questions leads to confusion about what the responses mean.
If asked to list an issue they think is (the most) important, respondents may struggle to discern if
the question is asking them to report problem that is important to society, important to others, or
personally important (Gershkoff, 2006; Henderson, 2014). Of course, scholars studying issue-publics
are interested in the latter. Additionally, it is hard to compare the relevance of the issue-attitude
they hold on the policy they listed relative to policies they did not list on the dependent variable of
interest. For example, if a given respondent reports in an open-ended response that immigration
policy is the most important issue to them, how do their attitudes on immigration policy affect
candidate evaluations relative to unlisted issues? How should the researcher decide what unlisted
issue should be compared? Traditional open-ended formats limit analyses of this type. This is
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especially important when evaluating voting behavior given the multi-issue nature of electoral
contexts.
Finally, some scholars infer issue-public membership based on some essential or demographic
characteristic of the respondent (Iyengar et al., 2008; Bolsen and Leeper, 2013; Henderson, 2014), I
will refer to this as interest imputation (Gershkoff, 2006). For example, (Henderson, 2014) categorized
people as members of the social security issue-public if they were over the age of 65. This approach
is appealing to scholars for its ease-of-use, but, for obvious reasons, comes with accuracy trade-offs.
It would be difficult to make the case that all citizens over the age of 65 care about social security.
In an effort to address these limitations, (Gershkoff, 2006) created an alternative measure for
issue-publics. Her method had respondents list up to five things they like/dislike about the two
parties, the two presidential candidates, and up to three items as the most important problems
facing the country. In total, this gave respondents 23 opportunities to list an important issue. She
then categorizes the issues they mention into one of several potential issue-publics. Additionally,
strength of issue-public membership was determined by counting the number of times a respondent
is categorized into a given issue-public. For example, if a respondent mentioned abortion policy
three times, they were considered a stronger member of the abortion issue-public than someone who
mentioned the issue once.
While innovative, there are two limitations to using the COR method. First, it is laborious.
Coding twenty-three separate items, especially as the sample grows, can become a herculean effort.
Second, while this method overcomes the lack of comparability endemic in traditional open-ended
measures, it is still somewhat unclear if responses to the different questions that comprise the
COR method have different meanings. Consider this example: someone reports they do not like
the Democrats proclivity for higher taxes and report climate change as an important issue facing
the country. Using the COR, method this respondent is equally a member of the taxation and
environmental issue-publics, but are gripes about (or compliments towards) one of the parties carry
the same meaning as what they report as important? How do either of these, separate or added
together, compare with items that fail to be reported? What unlisted items should be used for
comparisons? It would seem there is still room to improve how issue-publics are operationalized.
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A New Measure of Issue-Publics
The goal of this new measure was two-fold. The first was accuracy. I hoped to precisely categorize
respondents into issue-publics based on the issues they personally care about most. The second was
comparability. I aimed to compare the qualities of issue-public preferences against non-issue-public
preferences rigorously. To this end, my measure consisted of two parts, categorizing people into
issue-publics and ranking the importance of non-issue-public concerns. This measurement was taken
in the first of a two-wave survey design. The second wave administered the vignette experiment and
the candidate conjoint task. The policy content that appeared in the second wave experiments was
contingent on respondents’ answers in wave one.
At the start of the survey respondents were asked the following:
“Some people have a political issue that they care about more than most other issues.
They might think about the issue a lot. They might pay particular attention to news
about that issue, even when it’s not making national news. They might focus on what
political candidates say about that issue, and decide who to vote for on the basis of that
issue. Or they might just care about the issue a lot. Is there an issue like that for you?”
If they selected ‘yes’, they were be prompted to answer three open-ended questions using a
couple sentences: describe the issue they care about, explain why they care about the issue, and
explain what they want the government to do about it. This gave respondents who say they care
about a certain issue three opportunities to offer a policy they care about. With this information,
I gave respondents two separate codes. I will refer to the first as issue-area, which is the broad
policy domain to which their response belongs. For example, if a respondent reported that they
cared about policy brutality, their issue-area was coded as criminal justice policy. I will refer to
the second as issue-public, which is the most specific policy they report. The example respondent
mentioned earlier was categorized as a member of the police brutality issue-public. Respondents
were also asked to report if their opinion on this issue was liberal, conservative or neither. This
allowed me to definitively discern how the respondent perceives the directionality of their opinion as
opposed to how the researcher categorizes it for them.
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Soon after they answered the above questions respondents were confronted with a word-bank
presenting the fifteen issues and were asked to drag-and-drop each issue into a box that stacked
issues into a single column. Respondents were instructed to place the issue they thought was most
important at the top and place the other issues in descending order until they placed the least
important issue at the bottom 2. Respondents were be unable to continue the survey until the
rank all fifteen issues. Afterward respondents were asked to categorize their opinions as liberal,
conservative, or neither on all fifteen issues; the order in which the items appeared was randomized
for each respondent. An image of this tool can be seen in Figure 1 below.
Figure 1: Issue Ranking Tool
In total, for each respondent, I have an issue-area value, issue-public value, and the ranked
importance of fifteen political issues. I also have data on the ideological directionality on all of these
opinions. This allowed me to compare the qualities of their issue-area/public preferences against
issues ranked at certain levels. In the vignette experiment I used their issue-area code and the issue
they ranked seventh for the vignette experiment. In other words, I tested the pliability of their
issue-preferences with respect to the issue-code and issue seven in the presence of reinforcing or
cross-pressuring party cues. For the conjoint, I used the issue-public code and the items ranked 1st,
2Special thanks is owed to Dr. Timothy Ryan who was the principal intellectual architect of this measurement
strategy. This operation is also used in a joint project about issue-publics that is currently in progress.
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7th, and 15th. In doing so, I was able to illustrate the relative influence of these four issues and
candidate partisanship when deciding for whom to vote.
Study One: Issue Preferences and Party Cues
To test H1, regarding whether issue-publics are less responsive to party cues than non-members,
I employed a within-subjects vignette experiment. The experiment was fielded as an extra credit
survey in an introductory political science class at the University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill. In
total 130 students participated in the experiment. Respondents were be asked report their support
for two fictitious bills that were to be voted on in the lower houses of the California and Washington
State Legislatures. One bill dealt with substantive policy pertaining to the broad issue-area for
which they were coded (as opposed to the issue-public code), while the other bill pertained to the
issue they ranked seventh. The reason to focus on the broad topic, rather than a potentially more
specific policy area, is the more narrow issue-public code often referred to matters already addressed
by these states. For example, some respondents’ issue-area code was criminal justice, and their
issue-public was marijuana legalization. Given that both states already legalized marijuana, it
makes more sense to write vignettes about criminal justice. In other instances, the issue-public
codes dealt with federal policy (e.g. the Home Mortgage Interest Deduction), while the issue-area
was more ambiguous and easier to write a state policy for (e.g. tax policy).
This was a 2 (strong vs. weak cue) x 2 (issue-public vs. issue seven) experiment, and that
ordering of the stimuli was also independently randomized. In one assignment, the vignette informed
them about a bill related to their issue-public and was accompanied with a strong party cue, while
the next vignette addressed the issue they ranked seventh and had a weak party cue. In the other
treatment assignment, the reverse was true such that the issue-public vignette had a weak party
cue and the vignette about the seventh-ranked issue had a strong party cue.
Utilizing the strategy employed and validated by (Mullinix, 2016), the strong party cue told
respondents that the upcoming vote was likely to be divided along partisan lines, while the weak cue
informed respondents that there was going to be mixed support within both parties. Additionally,
in the strong cue condition, the article thumbnail showed a capitol building divided in the middle.
On one side, the picture was red and the other side was blue. Additionally, animated protesters
were present in the foreground. The picture was intended to reinforce the notion that the bill in
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question was an issue important to both opposing parties. In the weak party cue, the thumbnail was
a gallery view of the lower chambers of the California or Washington State Legislatures depending
on where the bill was to receive a vote. This was designed to convey that the issue was political and
real, but not necessarily partisan.
All of the bills were supported by the Democratic Party and advanced policy in a liberal direction
if passed. The format of all four vignettes are displayed below. The bill title and policy outcome
depended on the target policy area of the vignette. Specifically, policy outcomes and bill titles
were created for each of the fifteen ranked issues and every unique issue-area that was observed
otherwise. The vignette designs with embedded data placeholders can be seen in Figures 1 and 2.
The codebook outlining what policies and bill titles were associated with which issues can be found
in the appendix.
Recall that H1 posited issue-public members will not adjust their preferences in response to
party cues, while non-issue public members will. In order for H1 to be supported, I would need
to observe no difference in mean support for issue-public bills between the weak and strong party
cue conditions. For those results to be meaningful, there would have to be a treatment effect for
non-issue public groups such that respondents in the strong cue condition report stronger preferences
in their party’s preferred direction than those in the weak cue condition. Figure 4 displays the mean
support for bills in each condition with 95% confidence intervals. The results are further broken
down by party to determine if partisans moved in expected directions. Consistent with H1 results
indicate that the difference in mean support for the bill among issue-public members across the two
conditions were indistinguishable. In other words, respondents that received a strong party cue did
not report greater support for their preferred party’s position than in the weak condition. In fact,
Democrats exhibited more liberal preferences when given a weak party cue.
However, the results were nearly identical for bills related to issue seven. As a result, it does
not seem that the behavior described above was unique to issue-publics. There are three ways to
interpret these findings. First, citizens form opinions regarding legislation on a broad array of issues
independent of their party even when their party communicates their preferred position. Second,
the results are an artifact of the sample. The sample is small, so it is possible that results failed to
regress to their true means, which would be compounded by large standard errors. It is also possible
that college students are a poor place to test these sorts of questions. Party attachment strengthens
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Figure 2: Issue-Public Bill with Strong Cue and Issue Seven Bill With Weak Cue
as people grow older and interact with the political world (Converse, 1969). Given that college
students are generally political neophytes, they may not have developed the necessary trust in the
two parties to rely on party cues over their immediate policy judgments. Additionally, given that
the sample is comprised of introductory political science students, they may feel a demand pressure
to “think critically” about bills in the vignette rather than rely exclusively on their party. Third, the
results could be an artifact of the vignette design. Perhaps the treatment was not sufficiently strong
and respondents failed to observe a partisan cue. It is also possible that because there were dozens
of different bills employed in the experiment the treatment was too heterogeneous to yield clean
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Figure 3: Issue-Public Bill with Weak Cue and Issue Seven Bill With Strong Cue
results across the conditions. As of this writing, I am inclined to adopt the latter two interpretations
of the results. More work will have to be done to make definitive statements regarding the veracity
of H1.
Study Two: Issue Preferences, Candidate Partisanship and Voting Decisions
Recall that H2 predicted that issue-public members will vote for out-party candidates if two
conditions are met. First, they must know both candidates stances on regarding the issue they
care about. Second, both candidates must adopt the non-traditional party stance. I will test this
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framework utilizing a choice-based conjoint design. An example of a conjoint pair can be see on
Figure 5. The order of the attributes in “candidate attributes” and “candidate politics” sections
were be randomized independently of each other for ease-of-use. The values each attribute could
take in the conjoint can be found in the appendix.
Respondents in this study chose between two candidates who randomly vary along ten different
attributes. Each respondent was asked to evaluate ten candidate pairs. Because each individual
attribute varied randomly, it was possible to discern the marginal effect of each attribute on the
likelihood a given candidate is chosen. For my purposes, I was able to discern the relative weight
respondents ascribe to candidate partisanship or candidate issue-public policy stances when deciding
for whom to vote. Five of these attributes were be demographic characteristics of the two candidates:
veteran status, religion, age, former occupation, and sex. Five of these attributes addressed the
candidates’ politics. The first was candidate partisanship. During the analysis stage, these were
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Figure 5: Conjoint Example
recoded as “copartisan” and “out-partisan” for each respondent. For example, the Democratic
candidate was recoded as copartisan and the Republican was recoded as out-partisan for respondents
that identified as Democratic.
The other four were the candidates’ stances on issues related to their issue-public and the issues
they ranked most important, seventh most important, and least in the ranking tool. Each ranked issue
was assigned a policy that candidates may or may not have taken a stance on. For example, if someone
reported being a member of the environmental issue-public, in the ${e://Field/conj issue public}
would appear the following: “More stringent regulations against industrial pollution”. The same
would have appeared instead for one of the other three fields if they ranked environmental policy first,
seventh, and fifteenth in the ranking exercise. In the scenario where respondents were categorized
into an issue-public that they also ranked as first, seventh, and fifteenth, the issue they ranked
second, sixth, or fourteenth respectively would replace it to avoid the same issue appearing twice in
24
the candidate pairs. The most common example was an issue-public member ranking that issue
first in the ranking exercise. When this occurred, the issue they ranked second would appear in lieu
of the first.
Candidates were shown as taking one of three stances for each issue: “supports the policy”,
“opposes the policy”, and “candidate has not taken a position on this issue”. Similarly to partisanship,
these were recoded as “consistent”, “inconsistent”, and “neither” for each respondent. At the end
of the survey, respondents were asked whether they support the policies they saw in the conjoint
task. When the respondent and candidate agree on a given policy (i.e. both support or oppose the
policy), the candidate stance was coded as “consistent”. When the respondent and candidate take
opposing positions (i.e. one supports the policy, while the other opposes it), the candidate stance on
that issue was coded as “inconsistent”. Finally, when the candidate failed to report a position on
the issue or the respondent reported that they neither oppose or support the issue, the candidate
stance was coded as “neither”.
Similar to study one, the respondents that participated in the vignette experiment also were
asked to complete the conjoint task. In addition, the conjoint task was fielded in the UNC Political
Science Subjects Pool in the Spring of 2019. Some respondents in the Subjects Pool also took the
other survey. To ensure that respondents were not double-counted, the Subjects Pool survey asked
if respondents were concurrently taking the class where the other survey was administered. For the
three respondents that answered yes, the survey automatically ended.
The results from the two samples were quite similar, so they were pooled for the analysis here.
In total, there were 241 respondents between the two surveys and each were asked to evaluate ten
candidate pairs, so a total 4820 “candidates” were evaluated. However, after independents, potential
cross-over respondents, and candidate pairs without a selection (i.e. no answer) were removed, 4008
pairs remained.
Because each candidate attribute is randomized, it enables me to calculate the average marginal
component effects (AMCEs) for moving from a baseline value in a given attribute to a different value.
These are the average difference in the probability of selection when moving from one attribute
value to another where the average is taken over all other possible combinations (Hainmueller et al.,
2014). For example, the AMCE of a candidate going from male to female was -.02, which should
interpreted as male candidates were two percent less likely to be selected than female candidates.
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Figure 6 shows the results for the full data. Consistent with conventional wisdom, respondents
were more likely to vote for copartisans. Specifically, copartisans were 20.3% more likely to be
selected than out-partisans. Importantly, when candidates move from issue-public stances coded
as “neither”, the probability of selection increased 16.3%. Perhaps more telling, candidates whose
stances are consistent with an issue-public member are 31.5% more likely to be selected than
inconsistent candidates. Both results are significant at the .01 level.
Figure 6: Average Marginal Component Marginal Effects with Full Data
While sizable, the advantage enjoyed by copartisans is certainly less than is seen in American
elections where it is not unusual for candidates to receive 90% of their fellow partisans’ votes
in the electorate. Additionally, the weight placed by respondents on issues seems greater than
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other research has shown. This is likely because the randomization of candidate issue-stances in
conjunction with my issue-public measurement strategy allowed for frequent cross-pressures that
force respondents to explicitly weight issue-based and partisan-based considerations that are unique
to each individual.
Figure 7: Average Marginal Component Marginal Effects of Cross-Pressuring Candidate Pairs
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−0.50 −0.25 0.00 0.25
Change in PR(Candidate is Selected)
Note: The data in this figure feature only candidate pairs such that the out-partisan was coded as consistent and the copartisan was coded as
inconsistent with respect to the Issue-Public Stance. Because of collinearity between Partisanship and Issue-Public Stance that is inherent in this
subset, they can not be estimated in the same model. However, exactly the same substantive results hold when Issue-Public Stance is used in lieu
of Partisanship.
Most importantly, H2 posited that issue-public members’ will vote for the out-party candidate
if both candidates adopt non-traditional party stances. To test this I ran an analysis only on the
subset candidate pairs where the co-partisan reported an inconsistent stance on the issue-public
policy and the out-partisan reported a consistent stance on the issue-public policy. There were 415
candidate pairs (830 total candidates) that met this criterion. This subset of the data allowed me
to sort out the observational equivalence that plagues most analyses of partisan versus issue-based
voting. This subsetting, by definition, induced collinearity between candidates’ issue-public stances
and partisanship because out-partisans were always consistent and copartisans were never consistent.
Consequently, issue-public stance and partisanship can not be in the same model because their
effects can not be distinguished from each other. Nonetheless, I was able to observe the effect of
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partisanship when the candidates cross-pressure issue-publics. In order to reject the null hypothesis
for H2, respondents would have to be more likely to vote for out-partisans than copartisans. This is
exactly what is shown in Figure 7. Specifically, when out-partisans held stances consistent with
issue-publics, while copartisans held stances that were inconsistent, respondents were 34.6% less
likely to vote for copartisans, which is significant at the .01 level. In other words, when put in
a position where respondents had to choose between supporting their party or advancing their
interests regarding the issue they care about most, respondents overwhelming chose policy over
party.
The results above can also be illustrated more descriptively. Figure 8 shows the percentage of
time respondents voted for copartisan candidates when presented with four types of candidate pairs.
Reinforcing pairs were those such that the copartisan candidate was coded as having an issue-public
stance that was consistent with the respondent, while the out-partisan was coded as inconsistent.
Cross-pressuring pairs were those for which the opposite was true: the copartisan was inconsistent,
while the out-partisan was consistent. Both inconsistent (consistent) were pairs that featured both
candidates holding a(n) inconsistent (consistent stance). For purposes of presentation and ease of
interpretation, two other types of pairs were omitted. The first was when both candidates were
coded as neither. The second is when one candidate was inconsistent and the other was coded as
neither. Their omission does not alter the substantive meaning of the figure as respondents voted
for copartisans among those pairs at a similar rate to pairs that featured candidates that held the
same issue-public stance. A figure with all categories included can be found in the appendix.
The first three bars of Figure 8 tell a story familiar to political scientists: respondents had strong
preferences for copartisans. When the candidates held issue-public policy stances that reinforce
the respondent’s partisan identity, they voted for the copartisan candidate 79% of the time. This
relationship deteriorates somewhat when both candidates held the same stance with respect to
the issue-public policy. When both candidates held a consistent issue-public stance respondents
favored copartisans 66% of the time and 61% when both candidates were inconsistent. Interestingly,
this may imply there are unique penalties for copartisans deviating from expected policy positions
relative to out-partisans. Nonetheless, copartisans still enjoyed an electoral advantage. However,
like the earlier analysis, Figure 8 shows that under the right conditions, respondents systematically
favored out-partisans because of issue-based concerns. When candidates’ issue-public policy stances
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cross-pressured the respondents’ partisan identities, they voted for copartisans merely 33% of the
time.
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Note: The graph indicates the how often issue-publics voted for copartisan candidates when presented with four types of candidate pairs. Reinforcing
pairs were those such that the copartisan candidate was coded as having an issue-public stance that was consistent with the respondent, while
the out-partisan was coded as inconsistent. Cross-pressuring pairs were those for which the opposite was true. Both inconsistent (consistent) were
pairs that featured both candidates holding a(n) inconsistent (consistent stance).
Conclusion
This paper detailed and tested a theoretical framework to suggest that issue-publics are uniquely
capable of shirking partisan cues and systematically voting for out-party candidates under the right
conditions. While I failed to find evidence for the former, the latter found robust support in the
data. While promising, as discussed earlier, there are still serious external validity concerns given
the nature of the sample. College students, being young, likely have weaker party attachments than
the general population. Additionally, given that the survey was administered to students taking
introductory political science classes, they may have felt a demand pressure to base their candidate
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decisions on policy rather than party. Furthermore, there are likely few real world elections where
people possess as much candidate information as was the case in the conjoint. Future work should
explore the willingness of issue-publics to overcome the information cost necessary to learn both
candidates stances on an issue they care about, especially if provided candidate partisanship from
the outset. It could be the case that when provided policy information for free they readily use
it, but if they already knew the candidates’ partisanship, they don’t seek out further information,
even regarding issues the care about. Additionally, future work should explore ways to test this
theoretical framework with observational data and real-world behavior. Finally, these findings
are consistent with the possibility that issues are a constitutive part in the development and/or
maintenance of partisan identity. Future research should be dedicated to more carefully exploring
this possibility in light of these findings.
To my knowledge, this is the strongest causal evidence of citizen capability to consistently
engage in issue-based over partisan-based voting. This work would suggest that scholars may have
under-appreciated the important role issues play in how citizens interact with politics and the results
bode well for peoples’ latent ability to hold elites accountable for unrepresentative behavior.
Critics of my voting behavior theory may contend that even if I am right, the circumstances that
would lead to out-party voting are rare for most citizens. Indeed, in the modern era of polarized,
well-sorted parties (Levendusky, 2009; Hetherington, 2001) candidates normally do not take positions
counter to their party platform, much less both candidates doing so. However, my discussion in the
introduction about the labor vote in the 2016 election was such an example. Both candidates took
counter-party stances on a seemingly mundane issue, yet it may have been the difference. While
prior to the modern era of well-sorted parties, racially conservative Southerners who identified as
Democratic since the Civil War shifted their voting behavior, and eventually their party identity,
when Democrats became racially liberal and Republicans became racially conservative: an outcome
my theory would predict. Additionally, the work done by (Hillygus and Shields, 2014) suggests
that 25% of people report disagreeing with their party on an issue that is personally important,
which is suggestive of the political potential for these sorts of shifts to occur again. I argue that this
framework is and will continue to be politically significant.
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Note: The graph indicates the how often issue-publics voted for copartisan candidates when presented with four types of candidate pairs. Reinforcing
pairs were those such that the copartisan candidate was coded as having an issue-public stance that was consistent with the respondent, while
the out-partisan was coded as inconsistent. Cross-pressuring pairs were those for which the opposite was true. Both inconsistent (consistent) were
pairs that featured both candidates holding a(n) inconsistent (consistent stance). Similarly, both neither were pairs that included two candidate
coded as neither. Finally, neither is consistent were those such that one candidate was inconsistent, while the other was neither.









Code 0 if the response seems legitimate: written by a U.S.-based human being who appears exactly 
once in the dataset. Code 1 if this response seems suspicious. 
 
The most important triggers for a suspicious response are: 
 
• Distinctive text that appears verbatim—or nearly verbatim—elsewhere in the dataset. (Code 
both responses as suspicious) 
• Text that appears like it might have been copied and pasted from the internet. (Feel free to 
Google any suspicious instances.) 
• Text that seems so far off-base that it seems like the writer might not understand the 
question or speak English. 
 





Does this response articulate a political issue?  
 
0 = No 




Only code if poli_issue==0. 
 
Does this response articulate some political concern—but not one that is an issue per se. I have in 
mind the sort of things that Converse might say represent a lower “level of conceptualization,” but 
something that is still political. General examples are references to the personalities or habits of 
prominent politicians. (Trump is a likely possibility.) Specific examples: 
 
- “Trump’s tweets” 
- “Nancy Pelosi is a smug liar who wants to steal from the American people.” 
 
In thinking about whether something is a “issue” versus and “alternative political concern,” there 
might be some gray areas. For instance, “Trump’s efforts to undermine the Russia inquiry” is sort of 
an episodic occurrence particular to Trump, so maybe not an issue. Then again, maybe it’s showing 
that the issue the person cares about is division of power in the government and checks & 
balances—which would be quite reflective of sophistication. For that example, I think I’d come 
down on the side of it being an issue, rather than an alternative concern. 
 
. = Not applicable (poli_issue!=0) 
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0 = No alternative political concen 




Only code this is poli_issue==1 
 
. = Not applicable (poli_issue != 1) 
0 = issue is not clear 




The broad policy area of the OER. If it coincides with one of our pre-chosen issues, code it exactly 
as such. For references, here are the pre-chosen issues: 
 
1 = "Immigration policy" 
2 = "Health care policy" 
3 = "Abortion policy" 
4 = "Criminal justice policy" 
5 = "Environmental policy" 
6 = "Tax policy" 
7 = "Gun control" 
8 = "Marijuana legalization" 
9 = "Minimum wage policy" 
10 = "Net neutrality" 
11 = "Genetically modified organisms (GMOs)" 
12 = "Labor policy" 
13 = "Foreign policy" 
14 = "Support for the Arts" 




Code only if specific_policy==1. Was a more specific policy mentioned? 
 
. = Not applicable (poli_issue!=1) 
0 = No 




Code only if specific_policy==1. How MANY discrete policies were mentioned? (Code the precise 

















If there is any other reason we need to discuss this response, write a note about the reason here. 
Example: flipping through the responses, I saw one response that advocates repealing the 13th 





NOTE: I think there are other things to code here. In particular, I will be interested to code 
“careopen1” for whether the person mentions a personal stake in an issue (“I care about Israel 
because my family is from there” or “I care about women’s rights because I’m a woman.”) versus 
not (“I feel everyone should have access to good healthcare.”). But for now I’m prioritizing things 
important for launching Wave 2. 
 
General Coding Rules 
 
1) If respondents mention multiple policy areas, the policy area they mention first will 
determine their issue_area, unless they mention a more specific policy. In that case, the more 
specific policy they mention first is what will determine their issue_area and issue_public. 
a. For example, one person put “Women's right/abortion and gun violence”, but later 
said “I think planned parenthood should not have funding taken away and abortions 
should be a woman's choice. Gun control should be heavily regulated and enforced”. 
This person would have been coded as women’s rights had they not mentioned 
planned parenthood. Because they mentioned planned parenthood, their issue_area 





Some respondents spoke broadly about equality for all or spoke about equality for several under-
privileged groups. Their issue_area was classified as Social Justice. If they mention more specific 
groups, they were given a more narrow issue_public value based on the first policy listed. If no 




If respondents talk about this in terms of enhancing, limiting, or eliminating access, broadly, they 
were coded as providing a specific policy, but issue_public was still coded as Abortion Policy. The 
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issue_public would only be something different if they spoke to more specific policies that moved 




If respondents spoke about economic performance or philosophy broadly (e.g. jobs or socialism), 
they were coded as economic policy. Their issue-public was coded based on a more narrow concern 
listed if provided (e.g. welfare, taxation, etc). People who discuss inequality are also placed in this 
category. 
 
Environmental Policy and Climate Change 
 
Because environmental policy and climate change are so interlinked, respondents citing they only 
care about addressing climate change were coded as Environmental Policy in both the issue_area 
and issue_public variables 
 
LGBT Rights and Marriage Equality 
 
Because the Supreme Court acted on this issue in a fairly terminal way, when respondents mention 
marriage equality for LGBT people, they are coded as LGBT Rights rather than marriage equality to 
preserve external validity. It is unlikely that state legislatures and candidates would act on marriage 




Respondents discussing minimum wage spoke of it in terms of raising or lowering it, and sometimes 
to specific values. We interpret wanting the minimum wage directionally different or changed to a 
specific value as the same thing. 
 
When respondents report that they care about minimum wage and specifically say they want 
minimum wage to be a certain amount (e.g. $15 per hour), were coded as offering a specific policy, 
but still coded as minimum wage for the issue_public variable. 
 
Conjoint Issues, Bill Titles, and Policy Effects by issue_public 
 
1. Immigration Policy (c)  
a. CJ Policy 
i. Increasing funding for border security. 
b. Bill Title 
i. Compassion for Newcomers Act 
c. Policy Effect 
i. making it easier for undocumented migrant families to receive financial 
assistance from the state. 
2. Health Care Policy (l)  
a. CJ Policy 
a. Expand Government programs that provide health insurance to those who 
can not afford it. 
b. Bill Title 
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a. Healthcare Accessibility Act 
c. Policy Effect 
a. increasing public funding for programs that provide healthcare to low-
income families. 
3. Abortion Policy (c)  
a. CJ Policy 
i. Laws that inhibit women from obtaining abortion services. 
b. Bill Title 
i. Reproductive Freedom Act 
c. Policy Effect 
i. allowing women to receive an abortion later in their pregnancy. 
4. Criminal Justice Policy (l) 
a. CJ Policy 
a. Reducing sentences for most federal crimes. 
b. Bill Title 
a. Fair Sentencing Act 
c. Policy Effect 
a. reducing maximum prison sentences for most non-violent crimes. 
5. Environmental Policy (l)  
a. CJ Policy 
i. Increasing fuel-efficiency standards for automobiles to combat climate change. 
b. Bill Title 
i. Corporate Stewardship Act 
c. Policy Effect 
i. increasing tax penalties on companies that emit certain levels of greenhouse 
gases. 
6. First Amendment (l) 
a. CJ Policy 
i. Laws that make it easier for people to file defamation lawsuits (libel and 
slander). 
b. Bill Title 
i. Freedom to Publish Act 
c. Policy Effect 
i. making it harder for media organizations to be sued for libel.  
7. Tax Policy (c) 
a. CJ Policy 
a. Lowering taxes on businesses. 
b. Bill Title 
a. Income Tax Revitalization Act 
c. Policy Effect 
a. raising state income tax on top earners and lowering it for middle class and 
low-income families. 
8. Gun Control (l) 
a. CJ Policy 
i. Increased restrictions on the sale and purchase of fire arms. 
b. Bill Title 
i. Safe Communities Act 
c. Policy Effect 
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i. limiting the amount of firearm ammunition that can sold in a single 
transaction. 
9. Marijuana Legalization (l) 
a. CJ Policy 
a. Legalizing marijuana throughout the United States. 
b. Bill Title 
a. Second Chances Act 
c. Policy Effect 
a. exonerating all prisoners that are currently serving time for marijuana-related 
convictions.  
10. Minimum Wage Policy (l) 
a. CJ Policy 
a. Increasing the federal minimum wage. 
b. Bill Title 
a. Living Wage Act 
c. Policy Effect 
a. increasing the state minimum wage to $15 per hour. 
11. Net Neutrality (l) 
a. CJ Policy 
i. Codifying net neutrality in law to make it outside the regulatory purview of the 
Federal Communications Commission. 
b. Bill Title 
i. Keep the Internet Free Act 
c. Policy Effect 
i. requiring internet service providers to treat all internet data equally. 
12. Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs) (l) 
a. CJ Policy 
i. Increasing restrictions on genetically modified organisms. 
b. Bill Title 
i. Honest Labeling Act 
c. Policy Effect 
i. requiring food companies sell genetically modified produce to label their food 
as being genetically modified. 
13. Labor Unions (c) 
a. CJ Policy 
a. Right-to-Work laws. 
b. Bill Title 
a. Workers’ Freedom Act 
c. Policy Effect 
a. expanding worker’s collective bargaining rights across the state. 
14. Welfare Policy (c) 
a. CJ Policy 
a. Increased work/job search requirements to receive welfare benefits. 
b. Bill Title 
a. Assistance for the Working Poor Act 
c. Policy Effect 
a. raising the maximum income to apply for financial assistance, which will 
make more families eligible for benefits. 
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15. Support for the Arts (c) 
a. CJ Policy 
i. Reducing federal spending on the arts and humanities. 
b. Bill Title 
i. Support for Artistic Expression Act 
c. Policy Effect 
i. expanding state-sponsored spending on programs that advance art including 
music, dance, and physical art. 
16. Building Infrastructure (l) 
a. CJ Policy 
i. Increase federal funds designated to states to build/repair highways. 
b. Bill Title 
i. Building Up Together Act 
c. Policy Effect 
i. increasing state funding for construction of new highways and bridges. 
17. Affordable Housing (l) 
a. CJ Policy 
i. Expand government programs that subsidize housing for low-income families. 
b. Bill Title 
i. Shelter the Needy Act 
c. Policy Effect 
i. building new public housing projects for low-income families. 
18. Agriculture Policy (c) 
a. CJ Policy 
i. Laws that set price floors for most American crops. 
b. Bill Title 
i. Clean Communities Act 
c. Policy Effect 
i. lowering the legal requirements necessary to sue farms/agriculture companies 
for deteriorating local quality-of-life. 
19.  LGBT Rights (l) 
a. CJ Policy 
i. Expand workplace protections for LGBT identifiers. 
b. Bill Title 
i. Workplace Equality Act 
c. Policy Effect 
i. increasing penalties against companies that are found to engage in practices 
that discriminate against people who identify as LGBT. 
20. LGBT Rights Abroad (l) 
a. CJ Policy 
i. Levying economic sanctions on countries that violate the rights of LGBT 
citizens. 
b. Bill Title 
i. Protecting the Rights for Victims Abroad Act 
c. Policy Effect 
i. placing state tariffs on all imports from nations that are determined to 
systematically violate the rights of the LGBT citizenry. 
21. Animal Rights (l) 
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a. CJ Policy 
i. Implementing programs that allow the federal government to more vigorously 
investigate and prosecute people who commit animal cruelty. 
b. Bill Title  
i. Protection of Vulnerable Animals Act 
c. Policy Effect 
i. increasing criminal penalties for animal cruelty in the state.  
22. Student Loan Debt Relief (l) 
a. CJ Policy 
i. Relief for Americans with student loan debt from the federal government. 
b. Bill Title  
i.  
c. Policy Effect 
i. paying off all outstanding interest on the state’s citizens’ federal student loans. 
23. Health Care For Children (l) 
a. CJ Policy 
i. Expanding programs that provide low-income and high-need children with 
health care. 
b. Bill Title 
c. Policy Effect 
i. providing more state support for programs that pay for the health care 
expenses of low-income children. 
24. Universal Health Care (l) 
a. CJ Policy 
i. Implementing a single-payer healthcare system in place of the private health 
insurance system. 
b. Bill Title 
c. Policy Effect 
i. creating a state universal health care system. 
25. Planned Parenthood Funding (c) 
a. CJ Policy 
i. Decrease federal funding for Planned Parenthood. 
b. Bill Title 
i. State Support for Reproductive Services Act 
c. Policy Effect 
i. earmarking state funding to subsidize non-abortion services offered by Planned 
Parenthood. 
26. Police Brutality (c) 
a. CJ Policy  
i. Reduce the standard to try and convict police officers for use of excessive 
force. 
b. Bill Title 
c. Policy Effect 
i. offering large, competitive grants to local police departments to reform police 
training in manners that encourage deescalating tense situations. 
27. Women’s Rights (l) 
a. CJ Policy 
i. Expand protections for discrimination in the workplace. 
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b. Bill Title  
i. Workplace Equality Act 
c. Policy Effect 
i. increasing penalties against companies that are found to engage in practices 
that discriminate against women. 
28. Birth Control Policy (c) 
a. CJ Policy 
i. Remove the mandate that requires employers to offer health insurance that 
covers birth control. 
b. Bill Title 
c. Policy Effect 
i. subsidizing birth control costs for teens that purchase birth control without 
parental consent.   
29. Aid to the Homeless (l) 
a. CJ Policy  
i. Increase federal funding for programs designed to offer assistance to the 
homeless. 
b. Bill Title 
i. My Brother’s Keeper Act 
c. Policy Effect 
i. increasing funding for state-run facilities that shelter the homeless. 
30. Assault Rifle Ban (c) 
a. CJ Policy  
i. Repeal the federal ban on assault rifles. 
b. Bill Title  
c. Policy Effect 
i. expanding the definition of “assault rifle” in state law to remedy what some 
consider to be loopholes in the state’s assault rifle ban. 
31. Asylum Policy (c) 
a. CJ Policy 
i. Increase the standard necessary for undocumented migrants to receive asylum 
status in the United States. 
b. Bill Title 
c. Policy Effect 
i. expanding state protections for undocumented migrants that are seeking 
asylum in the US. 
32. Bump Stock Bans (l) (may have to be removed for external validity concerns 
a. CJ Policy 
a. Outlaw the purchase and sale of bump stocks. 
b. Bill Title 
c. Policy Effect 
a. increasing criminal penalties on vendors that violate the state’s bump stock 
ban. 
33. Carbon Tax (l) 
a. CJ Policy 
i. Levy a tax that will require businesses to pay a fee per metric ton of carbon 
dioxide they emit. 
b. Bill Title 
 41 
c. Policy Effect 
i. increasing the so-called “carbon tax” on businesses in the state. 
34. DREAM Act (l) (may have to be removed due to external validity concerns) 
a. CJ Policy 
i. Grant a pathway to citizenship for undocumented migrants brought to the 
United States as children. 
b. Bill Title 
c. Policy Effect 
i. expanding education efforts to inform qualified undocumented migrants about 
the benefits for which they are eligible under the state’s DREAM Act. 
35. Drilling on Public Land (c) 
a. CJ Policy 
i. Make it easier companies to extract natural resources from publically-protected 
land. 
b. Bill Title 
c. Policy Effect 
i. making it more difficult for businesses to drill on state public land.  
36. Drug Policy (l) 
a. CJ Policy 
i. Lower the criminal penalties for most types of substances classified as Schedule 
I drugs per the Controlled Substances Act. 
b. Bill Title 
c. Policy Effect 
i. lowering the criminal penalties for most drug possession offenses in state law. 
37. Economic Policy (l) 
a. CJ Policy 
i. Lowering taxes on businesses. 
b. Bill Title 
i. Workplace Safety Act 
c. Policy Effect 
i. increasing worker safety requirements that businesses are to follow, which may 
require some businesses to update their facilities. 
38. Education Policy (c) 
a. CJ Policy 
i. Invest in programs that offer parents a publically financed voucher to offset 
the cost of private school tuition. 
b. Bill Title 
i. Education Investment Act 
c. Policy Effect 
i. increasing state funding for K-12 public schools. 
d.  
39. Education Spending (l) 
a. CJ Policy 
i. Increase federal funding for state public schools. 
b. Bill Title 
i. Education Investment Act 
c. Policy Effect 
i. increase state funding for K-12 public schools. 
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40. Electoral College (l) 
a. CJ Policy 
i. A constitutional amendment that replaces the electoral college with a national 
popular vote. 
b. Bill Title 
i. Will of the People Act 
c. Policy Effect 
i. increasing criminal penalties for electors in the electoral college that vote 
against the popular vote of the state in presidential elections. 
41. Elimination of Charter Schools (c) 
a. CJ Policy 
i. Outlaw the use of public money to fund charter schools. 
b. Bill Title 
i.  
c. Policy Effect 
i. eliminating state funding for charter schools, which will end the charter school 
system in the state. 
42. Elimination of Tax Deductions (c) 
a. CJ Policy  
i. Removing most federal income tax deductions. 
b. Bill Title 
c. Policy Effect 
i. eliminating state and local tax deductions. 
43. Equal Pay for All (l) 
a. CJ Policy 
i. Increasing protections against wage discrimination for women, LGBT people, 
and other disadvantaged groups. 
b. Bill Title 
c. Policy Effect 
i. more severely penalizing companies that have been found to engage in wage 
discrimination against women, LGBT people, and racial minorities. 
44. Equal Pay for Women (l) 
a. CJ Policy 
i. Increasing protections against gender-based wage discrimination. 
b. Bill Title 
c. Policy Effect 
i. more severely penalizing companies that have been found to engage in wage 
discrimination against women, LGBT people, and racial minorities. 
45. Federal Background Checks on Gun Sales (l) 
a. CJ Policy 
i. Expanding federal background check requirements for the sale and purchase of 
firearms. 
b. Bill Title 
c. Policy Effect 
i. increasing penalties on vendors that fail to appropriately vet potential firearm 
buyers using the state background check system prior to selling them a gun. 
46. Foreign Policy (c) 
a. CJ Policy 
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i. Passing reduced sanctions on North Korea in exchange for commitments 
towards scaling back their nuclear arms development.  
b. Bill Title 
i. State Free Trade Act 
c. Policy Effect 
i. enabling goods to be traded more freely between other North American 
nations and the state. 
47. Freedom of Speech (c) (revisit this 
a. CJ Policy 
i. A constitutional amendment outlawing flag burning. 
b. Bill Title 
i. Online Responsibility Act 
c. Policy Effect 
i. instituting criminal penalties for cyber-bullying that has been found to lead to 
self-harm or suicide. 
48. Handgun Ban 
a. CJ Policy 
i. Banning the sale and purchase of handguns for civilian use. 
b. Bill Title 
c. Policy Effect 
49. Higher Education Funding (l) 
a. CJ Policy 
i. Increased financial support from the federal government for public institutions 
of higher education. 
b. Bill Title 
c. Policy Effect 
i. increased state funding for the state’s public colleges and universities. 
50. Hiring Protections for Felons (l) 
a. CJ Policy 
i. Laws that make it illegal for employers to search criminal history of prospective 
job candidates. 
b. Bill Title 
c. Policy Effect 
i. expanding protections for former felons against hiring discrimination in the 
state. 
51. Income Taxes (l) 
a. CJ Policy 
i. Increasing federal income taxes on top earners. 
b. Bill Title 
c. Policy Effect 
i. taxing citizens an additional 3% of their annual income. 
52. Mortgage Interest Deduction (c) (may also need to be removed due to external validity 
issues) 
a. CJ Policy 
i. Eliminating the home mortgage interest deduction. 
b. Bill Title 
c. Policy Effect 
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i. requiring mortgage companies to annually provide citizens with official 
documentation that tells mortgage holders the exact amount they paid in 
interest on their mortgage that year. This will make it easier for citizens to write 
off their home mortgage interest on their federal taxes.  
53. Litigation Against Farmers (c) 
a. CJ Policy 
i. A nationwide cap on the amount of money for which farmers can be sued for 
quality-of-life concerns. 
b. Bill Title 
c. Policy Effect 
i. lowering the legal requirements necessary to sue farms/agriculture companies 
for deteriorating local quality-of-life. 
54. Offshore Drilling (l) 
a. CJ Policy 
i. Increase restrictions on companies seeking to extract natural resources from 
coastlines. 
b. Bill Title 
c. Policy Effect 
55. Pediatric Oncology Research (l) 
a. CJ Policy 
i. Increase federal funding for pediatric oncology research. 
b. Bill Title 
i. Mercy for Children Act 
c. Policy Effect 
i. Increasing state funding for research exploring treatments and causes of 
various pediatric cancers. 
56. Racial Policy (l) 
a. CJ Policy 
i. Reduce the standard to try and convict police officers for use of excessive 
force. 
b. Bill Title 
i. Just Hiring in State Agencies Act 
c. Policy Effect 
i. expanding affirmative action programs at state agencies to reduce race-based 
hiring and promotions disparities. 
57. Renewable Energy (l) 
a. CJ Policy 
i. Increase federal investment in renewable energy research and infrastructure.  
b. Bill Title 
c. Policy Effect 
i. increasing subsidies for companies that generate renewable energy. 
58. Repeal the Second Amendment (l) (may need to revisit due to external validity concerns) 
a. CJ Policy 
i. A constitutional amendment to repeal the Second Amendment. 
b. Bill Title 
c. Policy Effect 
i. banning the purchase and sale of firearms in the state. 
59. Sentencing for Non-Violent Crimes (l) 
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a. CJ Policy 
i. Reduce minimum sentences for most non-violent federal crimes. 
b. Bill Title 
c. Policy Effect 
i. reducing sentences for most drug possession offenses. 
60. Separation of Migrant Families (l) 
a. CJ Policy 
i. End the separation of undocumented migrant families at the US-Mexico 
border. 
b. Bill Title 
c. Policy Effect 
i. banning state facilities or resources from being used to facilitate separating 
undocumented migrant families. 
61. Sex-Trafficking (l) 
a. CJ Policy 
i. Increase prison sentences for people convicted of trafficking women and 
children. 
b. Bill Title 
i. Saving the Trafficked Act 
c. Policy Effect 
i. making it easier for local law enforcement to investigate and prosecute 
landowners of businesses that serve as fronts for sex-trafficking. 
62. Sexual Assault (l) 
a. CJ Policy 
i. Increase the federal statute of limitations for offenses classified as sexual 
violence. 
b. Bill Title 
i. Justice for Victims of Sexual Violence Act 
c. Policy Effect 
i. increasing prison sentences for people convicted of sexual violence. 
63. Sexual Harassment at Work (l) 
a. CJ Policy 
i. Increase federal protections against sexual harassment at the workplace. 
b. Bill Title 
c. Policy Effect 
i. increasing penalties for employers that fail to appropriately implement state 
required sexual harassment protections at the workplace. 
64. Social Justice (l) 
a. CJ Policy 
i. Increasing protections against wage discrimination for women, LGBT, and 
other disadvantaged groups. 
b. Bill Title 
i. Workplace Equality Act 
c. Policy Effect 
i. increasing penalties against companies that are found to engage in practices 
that discriminate against women, people who identify as LGBT, or racial 
minorities. 
65. Stem Cell Research 
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a. CJ Policy 
66. Taxes for the 1% (l) 
a. CJ Policy 
i. Raising the federal income tax rate at the highest income bracket. 
b. Bill Title 
c. Policy Effect 
i. creating a new tax bracket in the state income tax system. It will require citizens 
to pay a 15% on every dollar they earn passed $450,000 a year.  
67. Teacher Pay (l) 
a. CJ Policy 
i. Implement a federal fund to provide all teachers that work a full academic year 
a $3,000 bonus. 
b. Bill Title 
c. Policy Effect 
i. giving every public school teacher in the state a $5,000 increase in their annual 
salary. 
68. The Border Wall (c) 
a. CJ Policy 
i. Construction of a border wall along the United States-Mexico border. 
b. Bill Title 
c. Policy Effect 
i. removing all state funding to agencies, programs, and private entities associated 
with building a wall along the US-Mexico border. 
69. The Death Penalty (l)  
a. CJ Policy 
i. Outlawing the death penalty in the United States 
b. Bill Title 
i. Second Chance Act 
c. Policy Effect 
i. commuting, or changing, the sentences of all prisoners sentenced to death to 
life instead. 
70. Trade Policy (c) 
a. CJ Policy 
i. Increase tariffs on imports to the United States. 
71. Vaccination Policy (c) 
a. CJ Policy 
i. Expand protections for families that do not vaccinate their children. 
b. Bill Title  
i. Defeating Preventable Diseases Act 
c. Policy Effect 
i. reducing the number of allowable reasons for parents be exempt from 
vaccinating their children.  
72. Veteran’s Affairs 
a. CJ Policy 
b. Bill Title 
i. Healing Wounded Heroes Act 
c. Policy Effect 
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i. increasing state support for health services offered by the state’s Department 
of Veteran Affairs.  
73. Veteran Health Care (c) 
a. CJ Policy 
i. Increase the federal support for veteran health care. 
b. Bill Title 
c. Policy Effect 
i. increasing state support for health services offered by the state’s Department 
of Veteran Affairs.  
74. Welfare for Non-Citizens (c) 
a. CJ Policy 
i. Outlawing public financial assistance for undocumented migrants in the United 
States 
b. Bill Title 
c. Policy Effect 
i. making it easier for undocumented migrants to apply for and receive state 
financial assistance. 
75. Workplace Protections for LGBT People ( 
a. CJ Policy 
i. Expand protections for LGBT people from discrimination in the workplace. 
b. Bill Title 
c. Policy Effect 
i. increasing penalties against companies that are found to engage in practices 
that discriminate against people who identify as LGBT. 
76. Workplace Protections for Women (l)  
a. CJ Policy 
i. Expand protections for women from discrimination in the workplace. 
b. Bill Title 
c. Policy Effect 
i. increasing penalties against companies that are found to engage in practices 
that discriminate against women. 
77. A Flat Tax (c) 
a. CJ Policy 
i. Restructuring the federal income tax system such that 15% of personal income 
is taxed across all income brackets. 
b. Bill Title 
c. Policy Effect 
i. reforming the state’s tax system in such a way that it more evenly taxes citizens 
across all income levels. 
 







































Baseline: 35-45 Years Old
46-55 Years Old −.016
(.029)
56-65 Years Old .004
(.029)




























∗p < 0.05; n obs. = 4008; n respondents = 205
Table 1: Average Marginal Component Effects and Standard Errors for Full Data
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Baseline: 35-45 Years Old
46-55 Years Old .056
(.063)
56-65 Years Old −.018
(.059)




























∗p < 0.05; n obs = 830; n respondents = 172
Table 2: Average Marginal Component Effects and Standard Errors for Cross-Pressured Respondents
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